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1. Introduction. The terrorist attacks in the United States on September
11, 2001 appeared to be a harbinger of increased terrorism and violence in
the 21st century, bringing terrorism and political violence to the forefront of
public discussion. Questions about these events abound, and “Estimating the
Historical and Future Probabilities of Large Scale Terrorist Event” [Clauset
and Woodard (2013)] asks specifically, “how rare are large scale terrorist
events?” and, in general, encourages discussion on the role of quantitative
methods in terrorism research and policy and decision-making.
Answering the primary question raises two challenges. The first is identify-
ing terrorist events. The second is finding a simple yet robust model for rare
events that has good explanatory and predictive capabilities. The challenges
of identifying terrorist events is acknowledged and addressed by reviewing
and using data from two well-known and reputable sources: the Memorial
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism-RAND database (MIPT-RAND)
[Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism] and the Global Terror-
ism Database (GTD) [National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START) (2012), LaFree and Dugan (2007)]. Clauset
and Woodard (2013) provide a detailed discussion of the limitations of the
data and the models used, in the context of the larger issues surrounding
terrorism and policy.
The models proposed fit tail probabilities for power-law and alternative
models based on data from both the MIPT-RAND database and the GTD.
These models are thoroughly explained and well executed, as are the results.
The predictive capabilities and forecasts, along with consideration of the
influence of exogenous factors such as attack type, target and economic
development are considered, presented and discussed clearly, affirming the
robustness of the methods. The authors estimate that, in the 40-year period
Received July 2013; revised August 2013.
This is an electronic reprint of the original article published by the
Institute of Mathematical Statistics in The Annals of Applied Statistics,
2013, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1876–1880. This reprint differs from the original in pagination
and typographic detail.
1
2 G. WHITE
since 1968, there is an 11–35% chance of a terror event at least the size of
September 11, 2001.
2. Comments. Terrorism and political violence are complex phenomenon
of human behavior [Horgan and Boyle (2008), Taylor and Horgan (2006)],
and rely on the fear and uncertainty surrounding rare events to create a
disproportionate effect that is difficult to directly measure [Crenshaw (1981,
1986), Waugh (1983), ?), Thornton (1964)]. In this context, making predic-
tions about human behavior is a tricky business, and interpreting an 11–35%
probability for an extreme event illustrates part of this problem. An 11–35%
probability sounds ominous, but, over a 40-year period, that translates to a
seemingly innocuous daily probability around 1 in 100,000. The temptation
is to interpret an 11–35% chance as near certainty, and a 1 in 1,000,000
chance as near impossibility. Neither of these time scales for interpretation
are useful, and belie a further problem with considering large scale histor-
ical trends when making predictions about rare events using only previous
history.
For example, in 224 years there have been 44 US Presidents; 4 (9%) were
assassinated. The first was in 1865; in the period between 1865 and 1901, 3
of the 10 US Presidents were killed in office (30%). Since 1901, only 1 (5%)
US President was assassinated. Making a forecast in 1864, and relying solely
on historical data, the expected number of US Presidents killed in office in
the ensuing 40 years would be 0. In 1902, looking back at the previous 40
years, there would be an expected 5 US Presidents killed in office during the
20th century. This example is hardly definitive, but it illustrates the point
that rare events involving humans are difficult to predict.
While Clauset and Woodard (2013) (rightfully) do not address this, their
paper does address the caveats of its results in great detail, which provides
the basis for raising the question, “what is the role of quantitative methods
in terrorism research and in assisting policy and decision makers?”
In Lum, Kennedy and Sherley (2006), a systematic review of the literature
reveals a significant increase in research on terrorism and counterterrorism
efforts since 2001, though only a small minority apply quantitative meth-
ods. Despite this, there are some notable examples, both included in Lum,
Kennedy and Sherley (2006) and after. Enders and Sandler (1993) use vec-
tor autoregression (VAR) and an interrupted time series approach to model
the effects of counterterrorism policies on transnational terrorism from 1968
through 1988. Dugan, LaFree and Piquero (2005) and Dugan (2011) use
Cox proportional hazard models, and their variants, to analyze the effects
of interventions on hijackings and IRA terrorist activity in Northern Ireland
[LaFree, Dugan and Korte (2009)]. Arce M. and Sandler (2005) propose a
game theoretic framework for modeling the interactions between terrorists
and counterterrorism efforts, and Saperstein (2008) and Minami and Kucik
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(2009) suggest modeling the interaction between terrorists and counterter-
rorism efforts using a dynamic linear modeling approach. Recent research
shows that patterns of terrorist activity are well modeled using a cluster pro-
cess interpretation of self-exciting process models [Hawkes (1971a, 1971b),
Hawkes and Oakes (1974)]. Self-exciting models have been applied to airline
hijackings [Holden (1986, 1987)], insurgent activity in Iraq [Mohler (2010),
Mohler et al. (2011), Lewis et al. (2011), Lewis and Mohler (2013)] and ter-
rorism data from Southeast Asia and Colombia [Porter and White (2012),
White, Porter and Mazerolle (2013), White and Porter (2013)].
One important aspect of modeling terrorism that is not explicitly stated,
but is implicit in Clauset and Woodard (2013), is the notion of different
processes for different levels and types of terrorist activity. This idea, illus-
trated by the fitting of tail probabilities for rare events, can help explain the
relative scarcity and sporadic nature of terrorism [Porter and White (2012),
Raghavan, Galstyan and Tartakovsky (2013)]. This extends to a complex,
unobserved latent process as a model for the occurrence, and resulting char-
acteristics, of terrorist events. The capability to model and describe complex
unobserved processes is well established and is an ongoing area of significant
research in the mathematical and statistical sciences. The advent of newly
available data sources, like the GTD and the MIPT data sets, and increased
awareness outside of the field of terrorism studies creates an opportunity for
mathematicians and statisticians to work more closely and in conjunction
with experts from academia, in policy and decision-making roles to create
new models and methods to expand our understanding of terrorism and
terrorist activity.
For the quantitative researcher, the utility of these models is obvious. As
exploratory tools they can reveal heretofore unobserved patterns in activity.
As confirmatory tools they can be used to test specific ideas and theories
about these patterns. The challenge for the quantitative researcher is to
understand their place in the field of terrorism studies as a whole, assisting
in the building of sound knowledge, and aiding policy and decision makers.
3. Conclusion. Terrorism studies itself faces an important epistemolog-
ical quandary, and there is an ongoing debate over whether terrorism—
however it is understood—should be analyzed within its individual context
or whether it can be assessed on a more universal level, across space and time
[Silke (2001), Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler (2004), Duyvesteyn
(2004), Neumann (2009)]. As a result, the role of quantitative (particularly
statistical) methods in terrorism studies is often lost in this debate. The
argument of terrorism scholars is that individual terrorists and acts of ter-
rorism are too unique to benefit from statistical analysis. The statistical
perspective is that the purpose of the statistical analysis of data is to make
inferences about the underlying process or context that produce the data,
not specific observations. Or, in the words of Sherlock Holmes:
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“. . . while the individual man is an insoluble puzzle, in the aggregate he be-
comes a mathematical certainty. You can, for example, never foretell what
any one man will do, but you can say with precision what an average number
will be up to. Individuals vary, but percentages remain constant.” The Sign
of Four—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle [Doyle (2003)]
While Holmes is a fictional character, his statement neatly sums up the
miscommunication that often occurs between statisticians–nonstatisticians.
Terrorism studies scholars and policy and decision makers want (and rightly
so) predictions at a very fine level, down to the individual’s behaviors. Statis-
ticians should agree that this is often beyond the reasonable expectation of
their methods. But statistical and quantitative methods can contribute un-
derstanding on combating terrorism by identifying and measuring specific
differences between contexts (i.e., countries, regions or groups). These can
be analyzed to identify contextual differences and explore why they exist,
providing a deeper understanding of terrorism and political violence.
Statistical methods do not intend to provide definitive answers; their re-
sults, couched in uncertainty, should inform, not make decisions. In order
to advance the understanding of terrorism, the benefits and limitations of
quantitative methods need to be clearly understood, and it is the role and
duty of the expert to clearly and effectively communicate the benefits and
limitations of quantitative methods to qualitative researchers and policy and
decision makers.
Acknowledgment. The author would like to extend his appreciation to
Ms. Kate Irwin, ML for providing excellent feedback and suggestions to
improve this manuscript.
REFERENCES
Arce M., D. G. and Sandler, T. (2005). Counterterrorism: A game-theoretic analysis.
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 183–200.
Clauset, A. andWoodard, R. (2013). Estimating the historical and future probabilities
of large terrorist events. Ann. Appl. Stat. 7 1838–1865.
Crenshaw, M. (1981). The causes of terrorism. Comparative Politics 13 379–399.
Crenshaw, M. (1986). Political psychology: Contemporary problems and issues. In The
Psychology of Political Terrorism 379–413. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA.
Doyle, A. C. (2003). The complete Sherlock Holmes, Vol. 1. In The Sign of Four. Barnes
and Noble Classics, New York.
Dugan, L. (2011). The series hazard model: An alternative to time series for event data.
Journal of Quantitative Criminology 27 379–402.
Dugan, L., LaFree, G. and Piquero, A. (2005). Testing a rational choice model of
airline hijiackings. Criminology 43 1031–1066.
Duyvesteyn, I. (2004). How new is the new terrorism? Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
27 439–454.
Enders, W. and Sandler, T. (1993). The effectiveness of antiterrorism policies: A vector-
autoregression-intervention analysis. The American Political Science Review 4 829–844.
DISCUSSION 5
Hawkes, A. G. (1971a). Point spectra of some mutually exciting point processes. J. R.
Stat. Soc. Ser. B Stat. Methodol. 33 438–443. MR0358976
Hawkes, A. G. (1971b). Spectra of some self-exciting and mutually exciting point pro-
cesses. Biometrika 58 83–90. MR0278410
Hawkes, A. G. and Oakes, D. (1974). A cluster process representation of a self-exciting
process. J. Appl. Probab. 11 493–503. MR0378093
Holden, R. T. (1986). The contagiousness of aircraft hijacking. American Journal of
Sociology 91 874–904.
Holden, R. T. (1987). Time series analysis of a contagious process. J. Amer. Statist.
Assoc. 82 1019–1026. MR0922168
Horgan, J. and Boyle, M. J. (2008). A case against “Critical terrorism studies”. Critical
Studies on Terrorism 1 51–64.
LaFree, G. and Dugan, L. (2007). Introducing the global terrorism database. Terrorism
and Political Violence 19 181–204.
LaFree, G., Dugan, L. and Korte, R. (2009). The impact of British counter terrorist
strategies on political violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing deterrence and backlash
models. Criminology 47 17–45.
Lewis, E. andMohler, G. (2013). A nonparametric EM algorithm for multiscale Hawkes
processes. J. Nonparametr. Stat. To appear.
Lewis, E., Mohler, G., Brantingham, P. J. and Bertozzi, A. L. (2011). Self-exciting
point process models of civilian deaths in Iraq. Security Journal 25 244–264.
Lum, C., Kennedy, L. W. and Sherley, A. J. (2006). The effectiveness of counter-
terrorism strategies. Technical report, The Campbell Collaboration, Oslo, Norway.
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. Terrorism knowledge base. Available
at www.tkb.org.
Minami, N. A. and Kucik, P. (2009). Developing a dynamic model of the Iraqi insur-
gency. In Proceedings of the 2009 Spring Simulation Multiconference. SpringSim’09 58
1–58. Society for Computer Simulation International, San Diego, CA.
Mohler, G. O. (2010). Gang rivalry dynamics via coupled point process networks. Un-
published manuscript. Available at paleo.sscnet.ucla.edu.
Mohler, G. O., Short, M. B., Brantingham, P. J., Schoenberg, F. P. and
Tita, G. E. (2011). Self-exciting point process modeling of crime. J. Amer. Statist.
Assoc. 106 100–108. MR2816705
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terror-
ism (START) (2012). Global terrorism database [data file]. Available at
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd .
Neumann, P. R. (2009). Old and New Terrorism. Polity Press, Cambridge, UK.
Porter, M. D. and White, G. (2012). Self-exciting hurdle models for terrorist activity.
Ann. Appl. Stat. 6 106–124. MR2951531
Raghavan, V., Galstyan, A. and Tartakovsky, A. G. (2013). Hidden Markov models
for the activity profile of terrorist groups. Ann. Appl. Stat. 7 2402–2430.
Saperstein, A. M. (2008). Mathematical modeling of the interaction between terrorism
and counter-terrorism and its policy implications. Complexity 14 45–49. MR2449531
Silke, A. (2001). The devil you know: Continuing problems with research on terrorism.
Terrorism and Political Violence 13 1–14.
Taylor, M. and Horgan, J. (2006). A conceptual framework for addressing psychological
process in the development of the terrorist. Terrorism and Political Violence 18 585–601.
Thornton, T. P. (1964). Internal war. In Terror as a Weapon of Political Aggitation
71–99. Free Press, New York.
6 G. WHITE
Waugh, W. L. (1983). The values in violence: Organizational and political objectives of
terrorist groups. Conflict Quarterly 3 5–19.
Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A. and Hirsch-Hoefler, S. (2004). The challenges of con-
ceptualizing terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence 16 777–794.
White, G. and Porter, M. D. (2013). GPU accelerated MCMC for modelling terrorist
activity. Comput. Statist. Data Anal. To appear. DOI:10.1016/j.csda.2013.03.027.
White, G., Porter, M. D. and Mazerolle, L. (2013). Terrorism risk, resilience and
volatility: A comparison of terrorism in three southeast Asian countries. Journal of
Quantitative Criminology 29 295–320.
Science and Engineering Faculty
Mathematical Sciences School
Queensland University of Technology
Brisbane, Queensland 4001
Australia
E-mail: gentry.white@qut.edu.au
